By Jackson M.O.
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Extra info for A crash course in implementation theory
9, pp. 263 264. O. and S. Srivastava 1996, Characterizations of Game Theoretic Solution Concepts which Lead to Impossibility Theorems," Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 63, pp. 23 38. Kalai, E. and J. Ledyard 1998, Repeated Implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 83, pp. 308 317. Kara, T. and T. Sonmez 1996, Nash Implementation of Matching Rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 68, pp. 425 439. 53 Kara, T. and T. Sonmez 1997, Implementation of College Admissions Rules," Economic Theory, Vol.
1998, Feasible Bayesian Implementation with State Dependent Feasible Sets," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 80, pp. 201 221. Hong, L. and S. Page 1994, Reducing Informational Costs in Endowment Mechanisms," Economic Design, Vol. 1, pp. 103 117. Hurwicz, L. B. McGuire and R. Radner, Decision and Organization, North Holland, Amsterdam. Hurwicz, L. 1973, The Design of Mechanisms for Resource Allocation," American Economic Review, Vol. 61, pp. 1 30. Hurwicz, L. 1979, Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points," Review of Economic Studies, Vol.
However, a case can still be made for attacking the problem head-on in the general setting. The reason for complementing the setting-speci c analyses with a general analysis is that it would generate insight to the additional necessary and su cient conditions that come with the consideration of mixed strategies. Given how tailored the analyses are in speci c environments, it is not clear that such an understanding will be obtained by piecing together a catalog of results. A number of possible head-on approaches suggest themselves, even simply with respect to Nash implementation.
A crash course in implementation theory by Jackson M.O.